Abstract-Internet threat monitoring (ITM) systems have been deployed to detect widespread attacks on the Internet in recent years. However, the effectiveness of ITM systems critically depends on the confidentiality of the location of their monitors. If adversaries learn the monitor locations of an ITM system, they can bypass the monitors and focus on the uncovered IP address space without being detected. In this paper, we study a new class of attacks, the invisible LOCalization (iLOC) attack. The iLOC attack can accurately and invisibly localize monitors of ITM systems. In the iLOC attack, the attacker launches low-rate port-scan traffic, encoded with a selected pseudonoise code (PN-code), to targeted networks. While the secret PN-code is invisible to others, the attacker can accurately determine the existence of monitors in the targeted networks based on whether the PN-code is embedded in the report data queried from the data center of the ITM system. We formally analyze the impact of various parameters on attack effectiveness. We implement the iLOC attack and conduct the performance evaluation on a real-world ITM system to demonstrate the possibility of such attacks. We also conduct extensive simulations on the iLOC attack using real-world traces. Our data show that the iLOC attack can accurately identify monitors while being invisible to ITM systems. Finally, we present a set of guidelines to counteract the iLOC attack.
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INTRODUCTION
I N recent years, widespread attacks such as worms [1] , [2] , [3] and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [4] , [5] have been dangerous threats to the Internet. Due to the widespread nature of these attacks, large-scale traffic monitoring across the Internet has become necessary in order to effectively detect and defend against them. Developing and deploying Internet threat monitoring (ITM) systems (or motion sensor networks) is a major effort in this direction.
An ITM system consists of a number of monitors and a data center. The monitors are distributed across the Internet and can be deployed at hosts, routers, firewalls, etc. Each monitor is responsible for monitoring and collecting traffic addressed to a range of IP addresses within a subnetwork. The range of IP addresses covered by a monitor is also referred to as the location of the monitor. Periodically, the monitors send traffic logs to the data center. The data center analyzes the traffic logs and publishes reports to the public. Recall that in order to maximize the usage of such reports, most existing ITM systems publish the reports online and make them accessible to the public. The reports provide critical insights into widespread Internet attacks and are used in detecting and defending against such attacks. ITM systems have been successfully used to detect the outbreaks of worms [6] and DDoS attacks [7] . There have been many real-world developments and deployments of ITM systems. Examples include Distributed Overlay for Monitoring InterNet Outbreaks (DOMINO) [8] , SANs Internet Storm Center (ISC) [6] , Internet Sink [9] , Network Telescope [10] , CAIDA [11] , MyNetWatchMan [12] , and Honeynet [13] , [14] .
However, the usability of ITM systems largely depends on the confidentiality of IP addresses covered by their monitors, i.e., the locations of monitors. If the locations of monitors are identified, the attacker can deliberately avoid these monitors and directly attack the uncovered IP address space. It is a known fact that the number of subnetworks covered by monitors is much smaller than the total number of subnetworks in the Internet [6] , [9] , [10] . In other words, the IP address space covered by monitors represents a very small portion of the entire IP address space [6] . Hence, bypassing IP address spaces covered by monitors will significantly degrade the accuracy of the traffic data collected by the ITM system in reflecting the real situation of attack traffic. Furthermore, the attacker may also poison ITM systems by manipulating the traffic toward and captured by disclosed monitors. For example, the attacker may launch high-rate port-scan traffic to disclosed monitors and feign a large-scale worm propagation. The attackers may even launch retaliation attacks (e.g., DDoS) against participants (i.e., monitor contributors) of ITM systems, thereby discouraging them from contributing to ITM systems. In summary, the attacker can significantly compromise the ITM system usability if locations of monitors are disclosed. It is important to have a thorough understanding of such attacks in order to effectively protect ITM systems.
In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of a class of attacks that aim to localize monitors accurately and invisibly. Accuracy is very important for an attacker in identifying monitor locations. Meanwhile, invisibility is also vital to a successful attack. If the attack attempts are identified by the defender (such as the ITM administrators), countermeasures can be applied by the defender to reduce or eliminate the effects of the attack by filtering suspicious traffic (so that the attacker will not be able to identify monitors through traffic analysis [15] ), confusing attackers (to make the attacker obtain wrong monitor location information [13] ), and even tracking an attacker to its origin (so that attackers can be held accountable for their malicious acts [16] , [17] ).
Several attack schemes to discover the location of monitors have been investigated [18] , [19] . However, our work is the first to address an attack aiming to achieve the objectives of both accuracy and invisibility. It is challenging for the attacker to achieve these two objectives simultaneously. Intuitively, the attacker can use the high-rate attack traffic, as in [18] and [19] , to achieve high attack accuracy as follows: The attacker can launch high-rate port-scan traffic to a target network. The attacker then queries the data center for the report on recent port-scan activities. If there is a traffic spike in the report data reflecting the high-rate port-scan traffic sent by the attack, the attacker can determine that the target network is deployed with a monitor(s) that sends traffic report to the data center. However, the drawback of this scheme is its high visibility, since the launched high-rate traffic makes it highly visible to the defender.
In this paper, we investigate a new class of attacks called invisible LOCalization (iLOC) attack. In the iLOC attack, the attacker launches low-rate port-scan traffic (also referred to as attack traffic) to target networks. The scan traffic is encoded with a carefully selected pseudonoise code (PN-code), known by only the attacker. The PN-code embedded in traffic can be accurately recognized by the attacker even with the interference from background traffic aggregated by the data center but not generated by iLOC. Thus, the attacker is able to accurately determine the existence of monitors in the target networks based on whether the same PN-code is embedded in the report data queried from the data center of the ITM system. The PN-code modulated/embedded scan traffic will appear as innocent noise in both the time and frequency domains, rendering it invisible to others who do not know the PN-code. Only those aware of the original PN-code can correctly recover the encoded PN-code and identify the monitor locations. Therefore, using the iLOC technique, the attacker can accurately localize monitors while evading detection.
We conduct both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation on the iLOC attack. We derive formulas for both the accuracy and invisibility of the attack. We analyze and discuss the impacts of various attack parameters (e.g., PN-code length, attack traffic rate, etc.) on the effectiveness of attack. Based on the analytical results, we discuss how the attacker can select the attack parameters in order to achieve both attack accuracy and invisibility. We implement the iLOC attack and perform the performance evaluation on a real-world ITM system, which demonstrates the possibility of the iLOC attack. We also conduct extensive performance evaluations on the iLOC attack in a simulated environment. Our evaluations are based on replaying a large set of realworld Internet traffic traces collected by a real-world ITM system. The evaluation data demonstrate that the attack can accurately identify the locations of monitors, while evading detection by those who do not the know the PN-code used by the attacker. Furthermore, we present a set of guidelines on how to counteract the iLOC attack.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the iLOC attack in detail. In Section 3, a formal analysis of attack accuracy and invisibility and the impacts of various parameters on the performance of the iLOC attack are presented. In Section 4, we introduce our implementation of the iLOC attack and the validation in the real-world experiments. In Section 5, we report our performance evaluation results on the iLOC attack. In Section 6, we discuss some preliminary countermeasures against the iLOC attack. In Section 7, we review the related work. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
iLOC ATTACK
In this section, we will present the iLOC attack in detail. We will first give an overview of the iLOC attack and then introduce the detailed procedures of the attack, followed by discussions. Table 1 summarizes the notations used in this paper. Fig. 1 shows the basic workflow of the iLOC attack and the basic idea of the ITM system. In the ITM system, monitors deployed at various networks record their observed port-scan traffic and continuously update their traffic logs to the data center. The data center first summarizes the volume of portscan traffic toward (and reported by) all monitors and then publishes the report data to the public in a timely fashion. In this paper, background traffic refers to aggregate traffic collected by the data center but not generated by iLOC attacks.
Overview
As shown in Figs. 1a and 1b, respectively, the iLOC attack consists of the following two stages: 1) Attack traffic generation: In this stage, as shown in Fig. 1a , the attacker first selects a code and encodes the attack traffic by embedding a selected code. The attacker then launches the attack traffic toward a target network (e.g., network A in Fig. 1a) . We denote such an embedded code pattern in the attack traffic as the attack mark of the iLOC attack and denote the attack traffic encoded by the code as attack mark traffic. 2) Attack traffic decoding: In this stage, as shown in Fig. 1b , the attacker first queries the data center for the traffic report data. Such report data consist of both attack traffic and background traffic. Given the report data, the attacker tries to recognize the attack mark (i.e., the code embedded in the iLOC attack traffic) by decoding the report data. If the attack mark is recognized, the report data must include the attack traffic, which means the target network is deployed with monitors and the monitors are sending traffic reports to the data center of ITM systems.
Code-based attack. The iLOC attack adopts a code-based approach to generate the attack traffic. Coding techniques have been widely implemented in secured communications; for example, Morse code is one such example. Without knowledge of Morse code, it is impossible for the receiver to interpret the carried information [20] . In the iLOC attack, the PN-code-based approach we adopt has three advantages. First, the code is embedded in traffic and can be correctly recognized by the attacker even with the interference from background traffic. This favors the attack accuracy. Second, the code of sufficient length provides enough privacy. That is, the code is only known by the attacker, and thereby, the code pattern embedded in attack traffic can only be recognized by the attacker. Last, the code is able to carry information. A longer code is more immune to interference and requires comparatively lower rate attack traffic as the carrier, which is harder to detect. All these characteristics contribute help to achieve the objectives of attack accuracy and invisibility.
Parallel attack capacity. Intuitively, one simple way to achieve this parallel attack is to launch port-scan/attack traffic toward multiple target networks simultaneously by scanning a different port for each target network. For example, if the data center publishes traffic reports of 1,000 (TCP/UDP) ports, then the attacker can identify all these 1,000 networks simultaneously, attacking each network with a different port. Since attack traffic on different ports are summarized separately at the data center, the attacker can still separate and, thus, decode the traffic toward different targets. The attacker therefore can localize monitors in multiple networks simultaneously and accurately; however, can the attacker further improve the attack efficiency? Assuming that the data center only publishes reports of 1,000 ports, can the attacker fingerprint 10,000 target networks simultaneously, for example, by attacking 10 different networks using one port? High-rate port-scan traffic cannot achieve this as it is indiscernible whether a spike in the traffic report is caused by traffic logs from one network or the other nine networks. In order to achieve this goal in the code-based attack, the selected code and corresponding encoded attack traffic toward multiple networks for the same port should not interfere with each other (i.e., each of them can be decoded individually and accurately by the attacker, although they are integrated/ summarized in the traffic report from the ITM data center). The PN-code used by the iLOC attack can target multiple networks by launching probing traffic on the same port simultaneously. This unique feature can improve the attack efficiency significantly. The details of how to select the PN-code will be discussed in the following sections.
Attack Traffic Generation Stage
In this attack stage, the attacker 1) selects the code, which is a PN-code in our case, 2) encodes the attack traffic using the selected PN-code, and 3) sends the encoded attack traffic toward the target network. In the third step, the attacker can coordinate a large number of compromised bots to generate the attack traffic [21] ; however, this is not the focus of this paper. In the remaining sections, we will focus on the first and second steps.
Code Selection
To evade detection, the attack traffic should be similar to the background traffic. From a large set of real-world traffic traces obtained from SANs ISC [6] , [22] , we conclude that the background traffic shows random patterns in both the time and frequency domains. The attack objectives of both accuracy and invisibility and an attacker's desire for parallel attacks require that 1) the encoded attack traffic should blend in with background traffic, i.e., be random in both the time and frequency domains, 2) the code embedded in the attack traffic should be easily recognizable to the attacker alone, and 3) the code should support parallel attacks on the same port.
To meet the above requirements, we choose the PN-code to encode the attack traffic. The PN-code in the iLOC attack is a sequence of À1 or þ1 with the following features [23] , [24] , [25] : 1) The PN-code is random and "balanced." The À1 and þ1 are randomly distributed, and the occurrence frequencies of À1 and þ1 are nearly equal. This feature contributes to good spectral density properties (i.e., equally spreading the energy over all frequency bands). It makes the attack traffic appear as noise and blend in with background traffic in both the time and frequency domains.
2) The PN-code has a high correlation to itself and a low correlation to others (such as random noise), where the correlation is a mathematical utility for finding repeating patterns in a signal [25] . This makes it feasible for the attacker to accurately recognize attack traffic (encoded by the PN-code) from the traffic report data, even under the interference of background traffic.
3) The PN-code has a low cross-correlation value among different PN-code instances. The lower this cross-correlation value, the less interference among multiple attack sessions in parallel attack. This makes it feasible for the attacker to conduct parallel attacks toward multiple target networks on the same port. There are mature PN-code generators such as the msequence code, Barker code, gold codes, and HadamardWalsh codes [23] , [24] . In this paper, we use the m-sequence code, which has the best autocorrelation (it only highly correlates to itself with a sharp autocorrelation peak) [23] , [26] . We use the feedback shift register to repeatedly generate the msequence PN-code due to its popularity and ease of implementation [26] . In particular, a feedback shift register consists of two parts. One is an ordinary shift register consisting of a number of flip-flops (two-state memory devices). The other is a feedback module to form a multiloop feedback logic.
Attack Traffic Encoding
During the attack traffic encoding process, each bit of the selected PN-code is mapped to a unit time period T s , denoted as mark-bit duration. The entire duration of launched attack traffic (referred to as traffic launch session) is T s L, where L is the length of the PN-code. After the attacker launches port scans to target networks, he/she also queries the data center for the traffic report periodically. For brevity, this query interval is set to T s . The detailed discussion of determining these parameters will be presented in Section 3.
The encoding is conducted based on the following rules: each bit of the PN-code maps to a mark-bit duration T s ; when the PN-code bit is þ1, port-scan traffic with a high rate, denoted as mark traffic rate V , is generated in the corresponding mark-bit duration; when the code bit is À1, no port-scan traffic is generated in the corresponding mark-bit duration. Thus, the attacker embeds the attack traffic with a special pattern, i.e., the original PN-code. Recall that after this encoding process, the PN-code pattern embedded in traffic is denoted as the attack mark. 
Attack Traffic Decoding Stage
In this stage, the attacker takes the following two steps: 1) The attacker queries the data center for the traffic report data, which consist of both the attack traffic and the background traffic. 2) From the report data, the attacker attempts to recognize the embedded attack mark. The existence of the attack mark determines whether the targeted network is deployed with monitors or not. As the query of traffic report data is relatively straightforward, here, we only detail the second step, i.e., attack mark recognition, as follows.
In the report data queried from the data center, the attack traffic encoded with the attack mark is mixed with the background traffic, which is aggregated by the data center but not generated by iLOC. It is critical for the iLOC attack to accurately recognize the attack mark from the traffic report data. To address this, we develop a correlation-based scheme. This scheme is motivated by the fact that the original PN-code (used to encode attack traffic) and its corresponding attack mark (embedded in the traffic report data) are highly correlated: in fact, they are sharing the same pattern.
The attack mark in the traffic report data is the embedded form of the original PN-code. The attack mark is similar to its original PN-code, although the background traffic may introduce interference and distortion into the attack mark. We adopt the following correlation degree to measure their similarity. Mathematically, the correlation degree is defined as the inner product of two vectors. For two
where Àð:Þ represents the operator for the inner product of the two vectors. Based on the above definition, we have ÀðX;
L . We use two vectors, i ¼ < i;1 ; i;2 ; . . . ; i;L > and ! i ¼ <! i;1 ; ! i;2 ; . . . ; ! i;L > to represent the attack traffic (embedded with the attack mark) and the background traffic, respectively. We shift the above two vectors by subtracting the mean value from the original data, resulting in two new vectors, L to represent the PNcode. Thus, the correlation degree between the PN-code and the (shifted) attack traffic can be obtained. Similarly, we can also obtain the correlation degree between the PNcode and the (shifted) background traffic as follows. According to the rules of encoding attack traffic discussed in Section 2.2.
Hence, the correlation degree between the original PN-code and the (shifted) attack traffic is ÀðC i ;
Furthermore, we can also derive the correlation degree between the PN-code and the (shifted) background traffic, i.e., ÀðC i ; ! 0 i Þ. The mean of such a correlation degree is close to 0, since the PN-code has low correlation with the (shifted) background traffic (i.e.,
. If the standard deviation of the background traffic rate is x , the variance of such a correlation degree is 
Thus, the correlation degree between the PN-code and the (shifted) background traffic is ÀðC i ; !
Based on the above discussion, the attacker can choose appropriate attack parameters (e.g., PN-code length L and mark traffic rate V ) to make the correlation degree ð V 2 Þ (between the PN-code and the attack mark traffic) much larger than the correlation degree ð x ffiffi ffi L p Þ (between the PN-code and the background traffic). As such, the attacker can accurately distinguish the attack mark traffic from the background traffic.
In the attack mark recognition, vector i is used to represent the queried report data, and vector 0 i is used to represent the shifted report data (by subtracting Eð i;j Þ from i ). According to the above discussion, 1 which is referred to as the mark decoding threshold, then the attacker determines that the report contains attack traffic and the PN-code C i and decides whether the target network is deployed with monitors or not. The accuracy of the correlation-degree-based recognition scheme is analyzed and evaluated in Sections 3, 4, and 5.
Using real-world traces provided by SANs ISC [6] , we show the results of correlation degrees in Fig. 3 and the PDF of the correlation degrees in Fig. 4 . We consider three types of correlation degrees here. The first type is the correlation degree between the PN-code and the queried report data (probe mark embedded) from the data center. This type of correlation degree has a comparatively large value. We use a PN-code of length 20, and the probe mark traffic rate is equal to 0:7 x , where x is the standard deviation of the background traffic rate. The second type is the correlation degree between the PN-code and the background traffic. The correlation degree in this type is much smaller in comparison with the one in the first type. The third type is the correlation degree between a randomly generated PN-code and the queried traffic report data from the data center. This simulates the case that the defender uses a guessed PN-code and attempts to recognize the probe mark generated by an attacker. We randomly generate 120 PN-codes with length 20 (instead of the original PN-code used to encode the attack traffic). The results show that these randomly generated codes achieve a much smaller correlation degree with the probe mark in comparison with the original PN-code. Thus, we know that the probe mark can be accurately recognized only by the attacker who knows the original PN-code. Notice that for the PN-code of length 20, the defender has a very small probability of 1=2 20 % 10 À7 to correctly guess the PN-code used by an attacker.
Discussion
In order to accurately and effectively recognize the attack mark (PN-code) from the report data, we need to find the segment of the report data containing the PN-code (i.e., we need to fulfill the synchronization between the port-scan traffic report data and the PN-code). For this purpose, we introduce a sliding-window-based scheme. The basic idea is to let the attacker obtain enough report data with small granularity. Then, a sliding window iteratively moves forward to capture a segment of the report data. For each segment, we apply the correlation-based scheme discussed in Section 2.3 to recognize whether the attack mark exists or not. The details of this synchronization is presented as 28. As shown in Fig. 5 , the attacker iteratively moves the sliding window forward. The attacker first sends a sequence of queries to the data center, and each query requests a portion of report data, which lasts for a given unit of time, known as query duration T q . To guarantee good synchronization and capture each bit in the PN-code, T q should be smaller than the mark-bit duration T s . Also, the attacker must send enough queries to ensure that the queried report data contains the entire attack mark and attack mark traffic. The attacker iteratively conducts a correlation test on the report data using a sliding window. For example, in the ith round, the attacker selects t i as the starting time for the sliding window. In the ði þ 1Þth round, the attacker moves the sliding window one 1 . The selection of T a is impacted by not only the values of 0 i and ! 0 i but also the desired attack accuracy, which is analyzed in Section 3. step (T q ) further, and the start time of the sliding window becomes t i þ T q , and so on. In the ith round, a sequence of data (with a length of L) is obtained in the sliding window. The first data in the sequence is the traffic data in time duration ½t i ; t i þ T s , the second data in the sequence is the traffic data in time duration ½t i þ T s ; t i þ 2T s , and so on. With this series of data, the attacker conducts the attack mark recognition procedure discussed earlier. The attacker repeats the attack mark recognition after each time, moving the sliding window forward until the attack mark is recognized or the sliding window has gone through all the report data. According to (1) , the computation complexity of one round of correlation test is OðLÞ, where L is the PN-code length. Therefore, the computation complexity for performing the correlation test is OðT s =T q LÞ. Given such low complexity, the correlation test can be carried out in real time.
There is a trade-off in selecting the query duration T q . On one hand, if such a duration is smaller, although better synchronization accuracy can be achieved, the attacker needs to generate more queries to the data center, and more iterations for the synchronization process is needed. On the other hand, if the duration is too large, the attacker might not be able to correctly synchronize the probe mark, and the probe mark recognition accuracy will be reduced. The impact of query duration on attack accuracy is shown in Section 3.
iLOC ATTACK ANALYSIS AND PARAMETER DETERMINATION
Recall that there are some important parameters in the iLOC attack, including the mark traffic rate V , the mark decoding threshold T a , the length of PN-code L, and the mark-bit duration T s . In this section, we first present our formal analysis of the impact of different parameters on attack objectives. The analytical results are validated by empirical results presented in Section 5. Then, based on such analytical results, we further discuss how to determine attack parameters.
iLOC Attack Analysis
Attack Accuracy Analysis
In order to measure attack accuracy in terms of how correctly the attacker is able to recognize the probe mark and identify monitor location, we introduce the following two metrics. The first one is the attack success rate P A D , the probability that an attacker correctly determines that a selected target network is deployed with monitors. From the attacker's perspective, the higher P A D is , the better the attack accuracy. The second metrics is the attack false-positive rate P A F , the probability that the attacker mistakenly determines a target network as one with monitors. From the attacker's perspective, the lower P A F is, the better the attack accuracy. Recall that Àð:Þ represents the correlation degree operator between two vectors of the same length L. Vector Here, we use Gaussian white noise as an example in our theoretical analysis to provide insights into the effectiveness of iLOC attacks. Our simulation data based on real-world traces validate our theoretical findings well. Recall that T a is the mark decoding threshold and V is the mark traffic rate. We have the following theorem for the iLOC attack accuracy. The detailed proof of this theorem can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1.
In an iLOC attack, the attack success rate P A D is
where Àð
Notice that given the background noise ! 0 drawn from the Gaussian distribution, Àð 0 ; C i Þ can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution as well. This can be reasoned as follows: Based on (1), we have Àð
and Àð! 0 ; C i Þ can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution.
We have a few observations from Theorem 1. First, the attack success rate P A D increases and the attack falsepositive rate P A F decreases with the increasing PN-code length L. Thus, better attack accuracy is achieved. Second, with the increasing mark traffic rate V , a better attack success rate can be achieved as well.
Attack Invisibility Analysis
Here, attack invisibility refers to how invisible the iLOC attack is from the detection of the defender. In order to analyze invisibility, we need to consider the detection algorithms. While there have been many different algorithms proposed to detect anomalies in port-scan traffic, here, we use a representative and generic algorithm that has no specific requirement on detection systems and has been widely adopted by many systems [2] , [6] , [27] , [28] . In this algorithm, if the traffic rate (volume in a given time duration) is larger than a predetermined threshold T d , the defender detection threshold, the defender issues threat alerts and initiates reactions [6] . Such a detection threshold is usually obtained through statistical analysis of the background traffic. Note that the threshold T d must be chosen for anomaly detection, maintaining both the high detection rate (the probability that an ongoing attack is detected) and the low false-positive rate (the probability that an alarm is triggered when no attack is occurring).
To measure attack invisibility in terms of how well the iLOC attack can evade detection by the defender, we use the following two metrics. The first one is the defender detection rate P D D , the probability that the defender correctly detects the attack traffic introduced by the iLOC attack. The second one is the defender false-positive rate P D F , the probability that the defender mistakenly identifies the attack traffic.
Similar
The defender false-positive rate P D F is
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1; therefore, we will skip it here due to space limitation. Notice that in (9)-(12), our analysis for the detection algorithm assumes that 0 is measured and compared to T d every T s , where T s is the duration of 1 bit of a PN-code (also called the mark-bit duration). In reality, the defender may not have knowledge of T s , and this assumption helps the worst case attack analysis in terms of the attack invisibility. Note that as researchers assume that the encryption algorithms are known to attackers in cryptanalysis [29] , we assume that the strategy of mounting PN-code-modulated low-rate portscan traffic and its parameters such as mark-bit duration T s are known to the defender. This creates the worst-case security analysis in our study. Even without knowledge of T s , the defender can still develop adaptive strategies to carry out anomaly detection. For example, based on historical traffic logs, the defender may build the traffic statistic profile on different time durations. Then, the defender measures traffic on different time durations and compares them to the traffic statistic profile on the corresponding time duration.
We have the following observations from Theorem 2. First, with the increasing mark traffic rate V , the defender detection rate P D D increases. Thus, the attack invisibility will be worsened. Second, the mark traffic rate V does not affect the defender false-positive rate P D F , which is only determined by the threshold T d configured by the defender.
As we mentioned earlier, the query duration T q will also affect attack accuracy. Recall that the recognition of the probing mark is based on a sliding window, as discussed in Section 2.3. The maximum synchronization error between the PN-code and corresponding probe mark will be one query duration T q , as shown in Fig. 5 . We know that the correlation degree between the attack traffic and the PN-code is ÀðC i ;
, where C 0 i is the result of shifting C i by time unit T q , as shown in Fig. 5 . Notice that T q controls the maximal synchronization error. Based on the correlation degree defined in (1), we have
Þ, and ÀðC i ;
Þ. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, as shown in the Appendix, the attack success rate P A D becomes
Determination of iLOC Attack Parameters
Determine V , T a , and L
An attacker can use the above analytical results to determine attack parameters. First, the attacker can determine the mark traffic rate V . The reasons are the following: 1) V is only related to the attack invisibility metric (defender detection rate P D D ), and 2) V impacts the determination of other parameters. Given the expected false-alarm rate, the attacker can also determine the mark decoding threshold T a and the PN-code length L. Notice that the parameter for the background traffic x can be obtained through analyzing historical traffic data published by the data center of ITM systems. We give the details of determining attack parameters as follows: 1) Mark traffic rate: Using (12), the attacker can first estimate the defender threshold T d , given a reasonable upper bound of defender false-positive rate P D F . Notice that the T d should be selected to be larger than the background traffic x . For example, using central limitation theory, we know that T d ¼ 3 x achieves a reasonable defender false-positive rate P D F (1.7 percent). Thus, we can use 3 x as a reasonable estimation of T d . Given the defender detection rate P D D , defender threshold T d , and background traffic x , the attacker can determine the mark traffic rate V by resolving (10). 2) Mark recognition threshold and length of PN-code: Given the mark traffic rate V (determined previously), attack false-positive rate P A F , and attack success rate P A D , the attacker can further determine the mark decoding threshold T a and L by resolving (6) and (7) in Theorem 1.
Based on the above discussion, we show the determination results of attack parameters in Table 2 . We determine the mark decoding threshold T a and the defender threshold T d in order to derive a reasonable attack false-positive rate P A F and defender false-positive rate P D F (below 1 percent). For instance, to achieve a 95 percent attack success rate P A D and 5 percent defender detection rate P D D , we can use a PN-code of length L ¼ 20 and a probe mark traffic rate of V ¼ 0:6 x . In Section 5, these numerical results are validated by our empirical evaluations.
Determine T s
To determine the mark-bit duration T s , the attacker needs to estimate the possible delay from the moment when attack traffic is recorded by monitors to the moment when such attack traffic is published by the data center. To make the iLOC attack effective, the mark-bit duration needs to be at least as large as such a delay. Otherwise, the traffic in different bit durations (each lasting T s ) may interfere with each other and make it hard to recognize the probe mark. Several possible ways can be used to estimate the delay. For example, the attacker may obtain such information through publicly available resources. Some ITM systems may publish such information on their websites. The attacker may also actively conduct experiments on ITM systems and measure the delay. For example, the attacker may install monitors and connect them to the targeted ITM system. The attacker can simply use such monitors to report logs embedded with special patterns (e.g., PN-code) and keep querying the data center until the embedded traffic patterns are recognized. After repeating the above process for a number of times, the attacker is able to derive the statistic profile of delay and then determine the mark-bit duration T s . We use this method in our implementation of iLOC attack described in Section 4.
IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION
In this section, we first introduce our implementation of an iLOC attack. Then, we report validation results of the iLOC design and implementation on a real-world ITM system.
Implementation of iLOC Attack
We implement an iLOC attack prototype based on the design in Section 2. Recall that an attacker has two objectives: attack accuracy and invisibility. This prototype works against any ITM system with a Web-based user interface. There are five independent and important components in our iLOC implementation, as shown in Fig. 6 . Our iLOC is implemented in Microsoft MFC and Matlab on Windows XP OS. The five components are described as follows: Then, the PN-code encoded traffic is generated in a way as discussed in Section 2.2.2. The inputs to this component are the IP addresses of the target network, the port number, and the transportation protocol (TCP or UDP). 5. Probe Mark Decoder. This component obtains the port-scan report data through the Data Center Querist and decides whether the probe mark exists in the way discussed in Section 2.3 or not. The PN-code used in the decoding process is the same one used in encoding attack traffic and stored in the PN-code Generator. The decoding threshold is determined by this component based on the attack accuracy requirement and the background traffic profile, as explained in Section 3.1.
Validation of iLOC Attack
The evaluation should be carried out over a real ITM system in an ideal situation. Since an extensive experiment on a real ITM system will affect its usability (e.g., generating skewed reports of the actual Internet traffic), in our evaluation, we considered both experiments with a real-world ITM system and simulations using offline traffic traces. In order to validate our iLOC implementation, we carried out experiments with a real-world threat monitoring system, SANs ISC, shown in Fig. 7 . We deployed several monitors that collect port-scan logs of the monitored networks and report data to the data center of SANs ISC periodically (every half hour). We launched the probing traffic addressed to these target networks deployed with monitors and derived the fine-grained report by periodically requesting the port report from the data center. Notice that if the monitors we targeted report logs more frequently and the data center of ITM systems collects and publishes logs more frequently, we can obtain a port-scan report with finer granularity. Fig. 6 . iLOC implementation components. Fig. 7 illustrates our experimental setup. For the purposes of this research, we requested information about the locations of experimental monitors in this figure. We were provided with the identities of two networks A and B. There are some monitors in network A, and there is no monitor in network B. The monitors in network A monitor a set of IP addresses and log the port scans. We (the attacker) execute the iLOC attack to decide whether monitors exist in network A and B, respectively.
In our experiment, we use a PN-code of length 15. The mark-bit duration is set at 1 hour. We use two machines. On one machine, the Encoding Process sends attack traffic to networks A and B, respectively. On the other machine, the Decoding Process sends a query to the data center every 20 minutes. With report data, we find that the Decoding Process can correctly determine that network A is deployed with monitors and network B is not deployed with monitors. Fig. 8 shows the traffic rate in the time domain. Based on the data shown in the Fig. 8 , we calculate the correlation degree. The correlation degree between the mixed traffic and the PN-code is around 28, while the correlation value between the background traffic and the PN-code is around 8. Given that the detection threshold is 14, we know that the attack traffic and background traffic can be easily distinguished. Therefore, the attacker can accurately identify that network A is deployed with monitors and network B is not deployed with monitors. Fig. 9 shows the traffic rate in the frequency domain in terms of the Power Spectrum Density (PSD). The PSD describes how the power of a time series data is distributed in the frequency domain. Mathematically, it is equal to the Fourier transform of the autocorrelation of time series data [30] . From these two figures, we observe that it is hard for the defender to detect an iLOC attack, since the overall traffic with an iLOC attack is very similar to the traffic without iLOC attack traffic embedded. That is, such experiments demonstrate that the iLOC attack can effectively and stealthily identify monitors in reality.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct the performance evaluation by merging simulated iLOC attack traffic into replayed realworld traffic traces.
Evaluation Methodology
Experiment Setup
In our evaluation, we use the real-world port-scan traces from SANs ISC including the detail logs from 01/01/2005 to 01/ 15/2005 [6] , [2] . 2 The traces used in our study contain more than 80 million records, and the overall data volume exceeds 80 Gbytes. We use these real-world traces as the background traffic. We merge records of simulated iLOC attack traffic into these traces and replay the merged data to simulate the iLOC attack traffic. We evaluate different attack scenarios by varying attack parameters such as the mark traffic rate V , the length of PN-code L, and the number of parallel attack sessions N (on the same port). We report the results for the cases where attacks are launched to port 4321 (representing an unpopular port with low traffic rate) and ports 135 and 25 (representing popular ports with high traffic rate). Experiments on other ports result in similar observations.
Evaluation Metrics
We explore both attack accuracy and invisibility to evaluate attack performance. For attack accuracy, we use two metrics: one is the attack success rate P A D , and the other is the attack false-positive rate P A F , which are defined in Section 3.1.1. For attack invisibility, we use two metrics: one is the defender detection rate P D D , and the other is the defender false-positive rate P D F , which are defined in Section 3.1.2.
Evaluation Schemes
We evaluate the iLOC attack in comparison to two other baseline attack schemes. The first one is the attack that launches a significantly high-rate of port-scan traffic to target networks, as introduced in [18] and [9] . We denote this attack as a volume-based attack. Notice that the technique used in our simulation for the volume-based attack is similar to the noise cancellation technique in [18] . However, the work in [18] did not provide much detail on how to choose the noise cancellation factor. The second baseline scheme embeds the attack traffic with a 4unique frequency pattern. In this attack, the attack traffic rate changes periodically. Then, the attacker expects that the report data from the data center show such a unique frequency pattern if the selected target network is deployed with monitors. We denote this 2. We thank the ISC for providing us valuable traces for this research. attack scheme as a frequency-based attack. All three evaluated attack schemes are listed in Table 3 .
For fairness, we adjust the detection thresholds in all schemes so that the desired attack false-positive rate P A F and defender false-positive rate P D F (below 1 percent) are achieved. For the iLOC attack, we generate different attack traffic based on a variant PN-code length L (i.e., 15, 30, and 45). The default PN-code length is set to 30. To better quantify the attack traffic rate for the iLOC attack and other attack schemes, we use the normalized attack traffic rate P , which is defined as P ¼ V = x for an iLOC attack, where x is the standard variation for the background traffic rate. The default value of T q ¼ 0:1T s .
Evaluation Results
Attack Accuracy
To compare the attack accuracy of the iLOC attack with that of volume-and frequency-based probe schemes, we plot the attack success rate P A D under different attack traffic rates (e.g., P ¼ ½0:01; 3). Figs. 10, 11, and 12 show the results on different ports. From these figures, we observe that both iLOC and frequency-based attacks consistently achieve a much higher attack success rate P A D than the volumebased scheme. This performance improvement is more significant when the attack traffic rate is lower. The reason can be explained as follows: For the iLOC scheme, the PNcode-based encoding/decoding makes the recognition of probe marks robust to interference from the background traffic. For the frequency-based scheme, the invariant frequency in the attack traffic is also robust to the interference from the background traffic. But the volumebased scheme relies on a high rate of attack traffic.
Attack Invisibility
To compare the attack invisibility of the iLOC attack with that of the other two attack schemes, we show the defender detection rate P D D on different ports (e.g., 4321, 135, and 25) in Tables 4, 5 , and 6. Each table shows the defender detection rate P D D , given an attack success rate P A D (90 percent, 95 percent, and 98 percent). Recall that the defender sets the detection threshold to make the defender false-positive rate P D F below 1 percent. In all tables, "(Time)" and "(Freq)" mean that the defender adopts the time-domain and frequencydomain analytical techniques to detect attacks, respectively. It is observed that our iLOC scheme consistently achieves a much lower defender detection rate P D D than that of the other two schemes. Therefore, the iLOC attack achieves the best attack invisibility performance. As expected, the defender can easily detect the frequency-based attack, as a unique frequency pattern exists in attack traffic.
Impact of the Length of PN-Code
To investigate the impact of the PN-code length on the performance of the iLOC attack, we show the attack success rate P A D for a PN-code of different lengths (e.g., 15, 30, and 45) in Fig. 13 . Data are also collected for various attack traffic rates. In the legend, iLOCðL ¼ xÞ means that the PN-code length is x. This figure shows that the attack success rate P A D increases with the increasing PN-code length because a long PN-code reduces the interference from the background traffic on recognizing the probe mark and thereby improves attack accuracy.
Impact of the Number of Parallel Localization Attacks
To evaluate the impact of the number of parallel localization attacks on attack accuracy, we show the attack success rate P A D for a variety of parallel attack sessions on the same port in Fig. 14. In the legend, iLOCðN ¼ xÞ means that there are x parallel attack sessions. This figure shows that in terms of the attack success rate P A D , the iLOC attack scheme is not sensitive to the number of parallel attack sessions. The attack success rate P A D only slightly decreases with the increasing number of parallel attack sessions. This is because the traffic for different attack sessions is encoded by PN-codes, which are lowly cross correlated (described in Section 2.2) and thereby have little interference. Fig. 15 shows the impact of the number of parallel attack sessions on attack invisibility. It can be observed that the increasing number of parallel attack sessions results in a slight increase in the defender detection rate P D D . Therefore, parallel attack capability can significantly improve the attack efficiency without compromising the effectiveness.
The iLOC attack achieves invisibility by using the PNcode, which causes a longer period for the iLOC attack than the ones in [18] and [19] . Nevertheless, parallel features of iLOC attack can significantly improve attack efficiency. In the following, we provide one example to compare the efficiency of our attack with the one in [18] and [19] . This example demonstrates that our attack is slower than the one in [18] and [19] , and the parallel feature of our attack can effectively reduce the performance gap between our attack and the one in [18] and [19] . Assume that a system that consists of 1,200 networks is attacked. Using one port, the volume-based attack needs 1,200 time units to perform the attack task. To fulfill the same attack task, iLOC with four attack sessions in parallel using a code length of 15 can achieve the desired performance of attack accuracy and invisibility, as shown in Fig. 14 . In this case, the total time for iLOC attack is 1;200 Â 15=4 ¼ 4;500 units, which is around four times that of the volume-based attack in [18] and [19] .
Impact of Query Duration on Attack Accuracy
To investigate the impact of the query duration T q on the iLOC attack accuracy, we show the attack success rate P A D under different query durations ðT q ¼ ½0:05T s ; 0:3T s Þ in Fig. 16 . In the legend, iLOCðL ¼ xÞ refers to a PN-code of length x. From this figure, we observe that with the decreasing query duration T q , the attack success rate P A D increases. The reason is that a smaller query duration improves synchronization granularity, and thus, the attack has a better chance to recognize the probe mark. Hence, the attack accuracy will be improved. However, the smaller query duration T q will also increase the number of queries sent to the data center and the synchronization time for recognizing the attack mark.
GUIDELINES OF COUNTERMEASURE
We have demonstrated the iLOC attack against ITM systems. Let us discuss possible countermeasures against such an attack. It is relatively easy to defend against the volume-based and frequency-based localization attacks, which embed either a spike pattern (using high-rate scan traffic) [18] , [19] or an invariable frequency pattern (using the attack embedded with a certain frequency pattern), since these two attack schemes show strong signatures in the attack traffic (either in the time domain or in the frequency domain). However, in order to defend against the iLOC attack, the defender needs insightful understanding of the attack. We provide several general guidelines for counteracting the iLOC attack from the following aspects.
Limiting the Information Access Rate
Recall that in the iLOC attack, the attacker must generate a significant amount of queries to the data center of ITM systems in order to accurately recognize the encoded attack traffic. We may explore such knowledge to reduce the effectiveness of an iLOC attack. To do so, the data center may throttle the query request rate. One possible way is to enforce human/system interaction for each query and thereby eliminate the automatic query in the iLOC attack. This can be conducted through authenticated registration, e.g., one authenticated registration is only valid for a certain number of queries. However, these limitations on the information access rate may also reduce the usability of ITM systems.
Perturbing the Information
Recall that in the iLOC attack, the attacker needs to recognize the encoded attack traffic. Thus, the quality of reports plays an important role in such a recognition process. To reduce the effectiveness of an iLOC attack, we may perturb the published report data by adding some random noise or randomizing the data publishing delay. This scheme is similar to the data perturbation in the private data sharing realm [32] , [33] , [34] . By perturbing report data, the attack accuracy of an iLOC attack will be degraded. However, adding random noise and randomizing the delay in publishing report data will also affect the data accuracy and usability of ITM systems. Studying such a trade-off will be one aspect future work.
Investigating Advanced Detection Schemes
Recall that in the iLOC attack, in order to effectively evade detection of monitors in ITM systems, the attacker has to continuously launch port-scan attack traffic to different target networks to localize as many monitors as possible. Consequently, the target IP addresses of attack traffic may exhibit a widely dispersed distribution [35] . Thus, analyzing the distribution of IP addresses may provide one possible method of detection. Additionally, in [36] , we proposed an information-theoretic framework to analyze iLOC attacks. In particular, we modeled the iLOC attack based on a communication channel and derived closed formulas for the capacity of iLOC attacks. Based on this framework, we studied two different kinds of iLOC attacks, which encode the probing traffic in either the temporal domain (the scheme studied in this paper) or the spatial domain (on multiple monitors). We also investigated the effectiveness of possible detection strategies, including centralized, distributed, and hybrid detection.
RELATED WORK
Many ITM systems have been developed and deployed since CAIDA initiated the network telescope project to monitor background traffic in 2001 [37] . The ITM system is similar to the knowledge sharing of distributed intrusion detection [38] . Although the IP addresses of monitors themselves can be protected by mechanisms such as encryption and Bloom filters [39] , the public data reported by these ITM systems could be used to disclose the IP address space covered by monitors. Existing attack approaches achieve this by launching high-rate port-scan traffic [18] , [19] . However, these kinds of attacks do not consider the invisibility of attacks, since the high-rate attack traffic exposes the attack.
The invisibility techniques in our work uses the camouflage principle, as illustrated by nature and the military. In nature, an animal can disguise itself as the object on which it stands in order to fool its predators or prey [40] . In the military, soldiers wear camouflage clothing designed to blend with the surrounding terrain [41] . As an invisibility technique, our work leverages the PN-code technology and extends it to a new Internet cybersecurity realm. The PN-code was initially used in military communication systems to provide antijamming and secured communication [23] . In wireless communication, the PN-code has been widely used to improve communication efficiency [24] . In addition, the PN-code has other broad applications such as cryptography [42] , secured data storage and retrieving [43] , and image processing [44] .
Our work is related to robust watermarking. There is some research on how to design robust watermarking for specific applications. For example, Li and Chang in [45] developed a watermarking scheme that allows the owner to publish a large number of media files, provides the owner the ability to detect watermarks, and prevents the owner from cheating by ambiguity attacks. Some research has focused on breaking digital watermarks and developing countermeasures. For example, Arnold in [46] presented a classification of attacks against digital watermarks along with countermeasures. They categorized attacks into different categories such as removing, desynchronization, and noise embedding. Briassouli and Mouline in [47] evaluated the effects of a desynchronizing warp attack (e.g., time-varying delay) on the performance of detecting watermarks. Liu and Subbalakshmi in [48] proved that the worst case additive attack (deliberately adding noise to degrade the watermark detection) against a watermark is a 3 À function ( is the distortion compensation factor). There is other work related to the digit steganography [49] , [50] , which intends to hide the presence of information despite its practical relevance for digital content (e.g., image and video) protection using watermarking and fingerprinting schemes.
Our work is also related to the covert channel. Various covert channels have been studied [51] , [52] , [53] . For example, JitterBugs is a class of inline interception mechanisms that covertly transmit data by perturbing the timing of input events in order to affect externally observable network traffic [52] . Takahshi and Lee in [54] assessed VoIP covert channel threats that utilize an IP phone conversation to illicitly transfer information across the network. In our study, the sequence of attack traffic to the monitor, the transmission of log information to the data center, and the transmission of query data back to the attacker forms a covert channel for the attacker to discover the location of monitors. Our work presents a deep study of PN-code-based localization attacks, addressing both accuracy and secrecy.
In this paper, we study techniques in applying the PNcode in the iLOC attack. The work in [16] also studied how to use PN-code to effectively track anonymous flows through mix networks. Since it is applied to a different problem domain, the solution in [16] is significantly different from the one in this paper, including the use of the PN-code, designed algorithms, decision rule, and theoretical analysis.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated a new class of attacks, i.e., the iLOC attack. It can accurately and invisibly localize monitors of ITM systems. Its effectiveness is demonstrated by theoretical analysis, simulations, and experiments with an implemented prototype. We believe that this paper lays the foundation for ongoing studies of attacks that intelligently adapt attack traffic to avoid the detection by defense systems. Our study is critical for securing ITM systems. Since the attacker has a large space to improve the secrecy of the attack, the detection of such an invisible attack remains a challenging task. A comprehensive study of other methods to protect the location of monitors is a part of our future work.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 1
i. Derivation of attack success rate P A D . The attack success rate P A D is the probability that an attacker correctly recognizes the fact whether a selected target network is deployed with monitors. Following this definition, we have
Then, P A D can be represented by
À1
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Let y 2 ¼ . Then, we have
ii. Derivation of attack false-positive rate P A F . The attack false-positive rate P A F is the probability that an attacker mistakenly identifies a selected target network as being deployed with monitors. If Àð . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
